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Abstract—To provide high ranging precision in multipath
environments, a ranging protocol should find the first arriving
path, rather than the strongest path. We demonstrate a new
attack vector that disrupts such precise Time-of-Arrival (ToA)
estimation, and allows an adversary to decrease the measured dis-
tance by a value in the order of the channel spread (10-20 meters).
This attack vector can be used in previously reported physical-
communication-layer (PHY) attacks against secure ranging (or
distance bounding). Furthermore, it creates a new type of attack
based on malicious interference: This attack is much easier to
mount than the previously known external PHY attack (distance-
decreasing relay) and it can work even if secret preamble codes
are used.
We evaluate the effectiveness of this attack for a PHY that
is particularly well suited for precise ranging in multipath
environments: Impulse Radio Ultra-Wideband (IR-UWB). We
show, with PHY simulations and experiments, that the attack is
effective against a variety of receivers and modulation schemes.
Furthermore, we identify and evaluate three types of counter-
measures that allow for precise and secure ranging.
Index Terms—security, ranging, distance bounding, impulse
radio, ultra-wideband
I. INTRODUCTION
Ranging, i.e., the estimation of distance between two wire-
less devices based on message time-of-flight, serves as a
building block in many applications and services. A number
of applications requires ranging to be both precise and secure.
Secure and precise localization [1], used e.g., for robot fleet
navigation, is one example. Physical access control is another:
As an example, consider a system for unlocking a car door
with a wireless-enabled key that combines two modes of
operation in a single physical layer: The door is unlocked
if: (1) the key is in communication range of the car (tens
of meters) and the user presses the “unlock” button, or (2)
the car determines that the key is in proximity of 1-2 meters
(conveniently located in the drivers pocket), not requiring the
“unlock” button to be pressed (like in Passive Keyless Entry
and Start (PKES) systems used in some modern cars). Clearly,
the proximity verification should be secure [2], have a meter
precision, and provide a range of tens of meters.
For ranging to be precise (to achieve meter precision)
multipath propagation has to be taken into account. Essentially,
under multipath propagation, a receiver receives a sum of
multiple distorted and attenuated copies of the transmitted
signal, each shifted in time by the propagation delay of the
path it traversed. In typical indoor environments, the channel
spread of the time-delays is in the order of tens of nanoseconds
[3], which translates to at least a few meters of ranging error.
To be precise, a receiver needs to accurately identify the time-
of-arrival (ToA) of the first path. This is especially difficult
under weak non-line-of-sight (weak NLOS) conditions, when
the first path is not the strongest path. A wireless technology
that is particularly well suited for this task is Impulse Radio
Ultra-wideband (IR-UWB or simply IR), because the very
narrow pulses it transmits allow for high ranging precision
and make the task of resolving the channel easier. We focus
on this technology in our investigation.
To make ranging secure, i.e., protect the integrity of ranging,
a cryptographic protocol should be employed. Such protocols
are known as distance bounding (DB) [4]. More precisely, DB
protocols allow a verifier to securely measure an upper-bound
on the distance to a prover (honest or malicious). However,
because of their cryptographic nature, these protocols abstract
away lower-layer details. This makes their implementations
potentially vulnerable to physical layer (PHY) attacks [5].
These attack completely bypass cryptographic mechanisms
and decrease the measured distance. The achievable distance-
decrease depends on the physical layer, and it can be in the
order of kilometers (ISO 14443 RFID, [6]) or hundreds of
meters (IR PHY of IEEE 802.15.4a, [7], [8]). In general,
IR PHY has the potential to mitigate such attacks: With
appropriate countermeasures in place, the achievable distance-
decrease can be limited to values in the order the channel
spread, i.e., 10-20 meters [8] (or even less, as we show in
Sec. V). This is another reason why we focus on IR.
In this paper, we explore a new PHY attack vector that
manifests itself when ranging is designed to be precise, i.e.,
when the ranging protocol attempts to find the first arriving
path. This allows an adversary to spoof the ToA estimation,
and thus decrease the measured distance and violate ranging
integrity. The distance-decrease achievable by this attack is
in the order of the channel spread. Although not as effective
as the attacks mentioned above, a distance-decrease in the
order of 10-20 meters remains a threat in some scenarios.
For example, the attack could allow an adversary to gain
access to a car parked in front of a restaurant, while the car’s
owner is enjoying his dinner, with his key still in the car’s
communication range.
We show, with detailed PHY simulations (Sec. IV) and
simple experiments (App. A), that the ToA attack vector
can be effectively exploited by an external adversary that
introduces malicious interference or mounts a relay attack,
or by an internal adversary (malicious prover). The malicious
interference attack, although it offers more modest distance-
decrease, has two advantages compared to the previously
2reported external PHY attack (distance-decreasing relay attack,
[5], [8]): It is significantly easier to mount, and it works even
if a secret preamble code is used. In the case of the relay attack
and the malicious prover attack, the ToA attack vector gives
an adversary the means to decrease the measured distance
by the maximum amount allowed by the countermeasures
advocated in [8]. Furthermore, we identify three types of
effective countermeasures and provide a detailed performance
and cost comparison (Sec. V).
II. RELATED WORK
Distance bounding was first proposed by Brands and Chaum
in [4]. A number of other DB protocols are proposed, address-
ing aspects such as distance bounding over noisy channels [9],
mutual ranging [1], [10], resilience to the terrorist fraud [11],
[12], [13], efficiency [14], privacy [15], and formal verifica-
tion [16], [17]. Most of these proposals ignore PHY issues.
Physical layer attacks against distance bounding were first
introduced in [5], which included the malicious prover attacks
and distance-decreasing relay attacks. The effectiveness of
PHY attacks against concrete PHYs is studied in [6] (ISO
14443 RFID and wireless sensor networks) and [7], [8] (IEEE
802.15.4a). It should be noted that the attacks in [5], [6],
[7], [8] focus on the packet payload (some preamble attacks
are developed in [7], [8], but only to make payload attacks
possible). In contrast, the attacks considered in our paper and
in [18] (where we first introduced the malicious prover attack)
focus on ToA estimation, hence on the preamble.
An IR-UWB architecture for implementing DB protocols is
proposed in [19]. The maximum distance-decrease an adver-
sary can gain against this PHY is 3−6m. This is achieved with
a short symbol duration of 20ns, which limits the applicability
of this PHY in dense multi-path environments. An ID-based
distance bounding protocol is implemented on proprietary IR
radios in [20]. In [21], the authors design a time-hopping-
based IR PHY that is secure against external, but not internal
attacks. Beyond IR-UWB, DB PHYs tailored to narrow-band
RFID systems are proposed in [12], [22], [23], and a DB
PHY for smartcards (wire-line) is introduced in [24]. These
RFID systems are designed for very short communication
(centimeters, decimeters or at most a few meters). Hence
the multipath problem is much less pronounced than for IR-
UWB, and a ToA estimation based on the strongest path is
sufficient. The authors of [25] introduce a fast analog method
of implementing the rapid response used in DB protocols
(< 1ns delay). Their proposal can be applied with a variety
of PHYs, including IR-UWB, and it can work with any ToA
estimation method, which means its implementations can be
potentially vulnerable to the ToA attack vector.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
The distance-decreasing physical-layer attacks that we con-
sider work on the packet level. Hence, we focus on the
exchange of a single ranging packet. Extending these attacks
to the protocol level is straightforward: The adversary simply
mounts the attack and some or all ranging packets exchanged
by the ranging protocol, be it two-way, one-way or pseudo-
ranging [8].
A. Modulation Scheme
A ranging packet is composed of: 1) the preamble, 2) the
data. The transmitted signal is:
s(t)=
NP∑
i=1
aPi p(t−iTPf −τPi )+
ND∑
i=1
aDi p(t−iTDf −τDi −TDtot)
(1)
where a P,D index stands for preamble, or data, respectively;
N is the number of frames, Tf is the duration of a frame,
ai ∈ {−1, 0, 1} is the amplitude of the ith frame, τi < Tf
is the time-hopping offset of the ith frame, TDtot ≥ NPTPf
is the time-offset between the preamble and data, and p(t)
is the pulse shape. We assume that the frame duration and
time-hopping sequences are such that there is no inter-frame
interference.
The data is modulated by a sequence aDi known only to
the transmitting party, whereas for the preamble aPi is known
to both parties, or is public. The sequences τi are known to
both parties for the preamble and for the data; they can also
be public.
B. Receivers
We consider two basic classes of receivers: a low-
complexity non-coherent energy-detection receiver (we also
use the term energy detector), and a more sophisticated rake
receiver. The former is composed of an antenna, a 500MHz
bandpass filter, followed by a squaring device and an integrator
that outputs a discrete time sample every Tint = 2ns. The rake
receiver is composed of an antenna, a 500MHz bandpass filter
and a filter matched to the pulse shape p(t).
We further distinguish between different algorithms imple-
mented by these receivers: vanilla (basic algorithms), PID
(Power Independent Detection [26], [27]), and MINF (min-
filter [28], [29]) for the energy-detection receiver, and vanilla
and PID for the rake receiver. The PID and MINF algorithms
are robust to interference. We consider them because they have
the potential to prevent malicious interference attacks. In all
cases, the receivers operate in the following stages:
• Coarse synchronization – the receiver detects a packet,
and achieves a rough synchronization (in the order of the
frame duration).
• Fine synchronization / ToA estimation – following coarse
synchronization that provides a rough ToA estimate, the
receiver finds a more precise ToA estimate.
• Channel estimation (optional) – the receiver estimates the
channel delay profile to improve the performance of data
demodulation.
• SFD detection – the receiver detects a special Start Frame
Delimiter sequence at the end of the preamble, indicating
that data demodulation should starting.
• Data demodulation.
The last 3 stages use classic maximum likelihood algorithms
for the vanilla energy detector and the rake (maximal ratio
combining), or variants of these algorithms that are robust to
multi-user interference [30] for the PID and the MINF energy
detector.
31) Coarse Synchronization: This stage is performed using
a traditional synchronization algorithm, based on correlating
the received signal with the known preamble template. More
precisely, the baseline method from [27] is implemented by
the vanilla and MINF energy detectors, and the conventional
method from [26] is implemented by the vanilla rake. Coarse
synchronization locks on the strongest path component of the
received signal.
The PID receivers rely on the PID method [27], [26]. In this
method the received signal is first compared to a noise-based
threshold, and converted into a binary (energy detector) or
ternary (rake) sequence (we call this the PID filter). In other
words, the PID filter performs binary (ternary) quantization
of the input signal. The output of the PID filter is then
correlated with the preamble template. This has a particular
effect relevant to our investigation: When a path is strong
enough, the pulses in all frames are converted to 1 (or -1) by
the PID filter, and the output of the correlator is maximized.
Thus, the PID receiver, in contrast to the vanilla receiver,
cannot distinguish a strong path from the strongest path.
2) Fine Synchronization: ToA estimation performs a back-
search [31], [32] in a window of duration TBS preceding the
rough synchronization point found by coarse synchronization.
The back-search window duration TBS should be in the order
of the channel spread. The back-search identifies the first time-
offset for which a noise-based threshold is reached – this
is considered to be the first arriving path, i.e., the ToA. All
receivers except MINF perform the back-search on the output
of the correlator that correlates the received signal with the
template. MINF [28], [29] uses an average of N preamble
frames, filtered with a moving min filter before averaging
(min-window length Wmin = 8). The min filter removes
interference based on the assumption that the interference is
present in at most Wmin − 1 consecutive frames.
3) Data Detection Window: This parameter, denoted by
tdet, determines the window that the receiver uses to demodu-
late one data frame (Fig. 1). For maximum reliability, it should
be at least as long as the channel delay spread. It plays an
important role in countering the attack.
C. Adversary Model
We distinguish three classes of attacks that aim to decrease
the measured distance: An internal malicious transmitter
(prover) attack, an external distance-decreasing relay attack
and an external malicious interference attack. We focus on the
latter attack. In this attack, an honest receiver (HRX) receives
a ranging packet (1) from an honest transmitter (HTX). This
signal interferes at HRX with the adversarial signal generated
by an adversarial transmitter (ATX):
sA(t) =
∞∑
i=−∞
aAi p(t− iTAf − τAi ) (2)
where TAf is the duration of a frame, a
A
i is the amplitude,
τAi < T
A
f is the time-hopping offset of the ith frame, and p(t)
is the same pulse shape as used by the honest transmitter.
Normally, the adversarial signal is spread by the channel.
However, we also consider a powerful adversary that transmits
over a single-tap channel (i.e., no multipath) by using a highly
directive antenna and/or moving close to HRX.
We distinguish between different types of malicious inter-
ferers. The simplest blind adversary is not equipped with a
receiver. Hence, it transmits its signal blindly, without syn-
chronizing with HTX. A reactive adversary is equipped with a
receiver, and synchronizes its transmission to the transmission
of HTX. The level of synchronization can vary. If it is in the
order of nanoseconds, we speak of a precisely synchronized
adversary. Note that even precise synchronization is quite
feasible to achieve: If the adversary places its adversarial
receiver close to HTX, it can reliably and precisely detect
the first pulse transmitted by HTX.
Furthermore, an adversary can be oblivious to the codes
used by the honest devices. Or, the adversary can know the
preamble codes (and the data time-hopping codes). We assume
the adversary does not know the amplitude data code (the
payload of the ranging packet) and we assume the adversary
always knows the frame lengths in the honest signal. Finally,
the adversary can target all devices in range. Or, it can target
a specific device, or a specific location. We term these attacks
broadcast or targeted, respectively.
The most sophisticated malicious interference attack we
consider is targeted, reactive and precisely synchronized with
the HTX; it is mounted by an adversary that knows the pream-
ble codes and the data time-hopping code. Such an attack is
– from the perspective of HRX – essentially equivalent to the
two other attack classes: In a distance-decreasing relay attack,
ATX and an adversarial receiver (ARX) relay (with small
modifications on the PHY) the ranging packet transmitted by
HTX to HRX. In a malicious transmitter attack, ATX sends
a malformed ranging packet to HRX. For more information,
see [5], [8].
D. Simulation Setup
We simulate malicious interference attacks only, because the
the malicious prover attack and the relay attack are essentially
equivalent to a sophisticated malicious interference attack.
HRX is exposed to the adversarial signal transmitted by ATX
at signal-to-noise ratio SNRA. HRX receives, at random
times, ranging packets transmitted by HTX with SNRH. (In
both cases, the SNR is defined as EpN0 , where Ep is the
energy of a single pulse, and the power spectral density
is N0/2.) We simulate the entire packet reception process
(from synchronization to demodulation) in Matlab, with a
self-developed simulator. The physical layer is simulated with
an accuracy of 100ps. We use the (weak) NLOS channel
model number 2 from [3] with a channel spread of roughly
60ns. Unless otherwise stated, we assume the parameter values
summarized in Table I.
Metrics: We consider that distance-decrease occurs if a
packet is received and the data is recovered without errors,
but the estimate ToA is at least Tdd = 4ns below the actual
ToA. (Tdd is chosen such that the probability of obtaining such
a ToA in benign conditions is negligible.) We consider that
denial occurs, if the packet is not correctly received – either
due to failure to detect the packet in coarse synchronization or
4frame length TPf ,T
D
f 256ns
preamble length NP 64 · 31
data length ND 32
preamble code aPi IEEE 802.15.4a code 5
back-search window TBS 64ns
data detection window tdet 128ns
energy detector sampling time Tint 2ns
TABLE I
DEFAULT PARAMETER VALUES USED IN SIMULATIONS. THE DEFAULT
IEEE 802.15.4A PREAMBLE LENGTH IS USED. THE BACK-SEARCH
WINDOW IS CHOSEN TO MATCH THE CHANNEL SPREAD.
(2) (1)
(3)
HTX
ATX
HRX
tdet
Fig. 1. The cicada attack (blind constant 1-attack) mounted against a vanilla
energy-detection receiver. HTX sends a ranging preamble modulated with a
preamble code [−1, 0, 1,−1, 0, 0, 1, 1, . . .]. ATX simultaneously sends the
adversarial signal. Both signals propagate through the multipath environment
before they are received by HRX. HRX aggregates the received signal over
a number of pulses, and finds the strongest path (1). It then searches back
for the first path (2), but instead selects the bogus path introduced by the
adversary (3). However, even shifted back, the data detection window tdet is
large enough to capture a significant fraction of the honest signal, allowing
for correct data demodulation.
due to failure of subsequent reception stages. We measure the
percentage, or the rate of packets subject to distance-decrease
or denial. As an additional metric, we measure the amount
of distance-decrease (ToA error) for the packets for which
distance-decrease occurs.
IV. ATTACKS
In this section, we provide an overview of the attack
space. We look at various variants of the attack and evaluate
their effectiveness against different modulation schemes and
receivers. We investigate the attacks in increasing complexity.
We first explore the simplest cicada attack, and demonstrate
that it is effective against most receivers, with and without
preamble time-hopping. Next, we generalize the attack to the
coded cicada attack and show how this attack can defeat the
vanilla rake receiver that is robust to the basic cicada attack.
Then, we discuss how a reactive adversary can improve the
attack effectiveness. Finally, we consider the most sophisti-
cated version of the attack, where ATX is tightly synchronized
and knows the preamble code. We show that this attack is
highly effective, even against strongest-path ToA estimation
algorithms.
A. Blind Attacks: The “Cicada” Attack
We start with the simplest attack, the cicada attack: A blind
adversary transmitting an infinite sequence of identical equally
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Fig. 2. Performance of constant 1-attack mounted against a vanilla energy-
detection receiver: distance-decrease and of denial (due to coarse synchro-
nization failure or failure of other reception stages) rates at SNRH = 20dB.
spread pulses: aAi = 1, τ
A
i = 0. The adversarial frame duration
is TAf =
1
ρT
P
f , where the attack rate ρ is an integer. We term
this the constant ρ-attack. Note that it does not require the
knowledge of any codes. Without synchronization with HTX,
adversarial pulses are shifted randomly with respect to the
honest signal. This is a broadcast attack.
This attack is tailored to modulation schemes without
preamble time-hopping. The principle is illustrated in Fig. 1.
The signals of HTX and ATX interfere at HRX. If the
adversarial signal is weaker than HTX’s signal, HRX should
correctly detect HTX’s signal. However, there is a good chance
that the fine synchronization algorithm will incorrectly find the
“first arriving path” in the adversarial signal. The estimated
ToA is then significantly lower than the actual ToA, resulting
in a distance-decrease. Furthermore, the distance-decrease is
typically low, such that the data detection window still contains
a large fraction of the honest signal. The adversarial signal is
weaker, hence HRX can demodulate the payload intended by
HTX.
If either the honest or the adversarial signal or both use
(random) time-hopping, the honest and adversarial pulses will
not be aligned. Rather, from the perspective of HRX, the
adversarial pulses are randomly spread over time. Still, if the
adversary transmits with appropriate power, such random inter-
ference turns out to be sufficient to spoof fine synchronization,
and not disrupt the other reception stages. We show this in
Sec. IV-A2.
1) Preamble without Time-hopping: The main factor de-
termining the attack outcome is SNRA. This can be seen in
Fig. 2(a), which shows the performance of the constant 1-
attack against the vanilla energy-detection receiver at SNRH =
20dB. For low SNRA, the adversarial signal is too weak to
influence the receiver operation. From SNRA ≈ 0dB distance-
decrease begins, and it reaches its maximum of around 36%
for SNRA ≈ 15dB. Beyond the maximum point, denial begins
to take over, and for SNRA ≈ 25dB, it reaches 100% –
partially due to coarse synchronization failure (DenialSYNC),
and partially due to failure of subsequent reception stages
(DenialpostSYNC). More generally, the distance-decrease begins
at SNRA ≈ 0dB and ends at SNRA ≈ SNRH, as shown in
Fig. 2(b). We observe this general performance pattern for all
receivers vulnerable to the attack.
With ρ = 1, the adversarial signal, even though spread by
the channel (Fig. 1), is not always present in the back-search
window. To increase the probability of distance-decrease, the
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Fig. 3. Distance-decrease rate achieved by con-
stant ρ-attack mounted against a vanilla energy-
detection receiver at SNRH = 20dB
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Fig. 5. Distance-decrease rate achieved by con-
stant 8-attack mounted against the vanilla rake
receiver at SNRH = 10dB with: no time-hopping
(“no TH”), data-only time-hopping (“no pTH”),
preamble time-hopping with a non-zero-sum tem-
plate (“not-0-sum”) and a zero-sum template (“0-
sum”).
adversary can increase ρ (Fig. 3). Note that increasing ρ also
results in distance-decrease ending at lower SNRA – this is
because there is more interference that disrupts other (than
fine synchronization) stages of the receiver operation, causing
denial. In subsequent experiments, unless otherwise stated, we
fix ρ = 8, which strikes a balance between achieving a high
maximum distance-decrease rate and not interfering too much
with other stages of the receiver operation.
We observe a similar attack performance for the MINF and
PID energy-detection receivers (Fig. 4). Both methods were
designed with benign interference in mind but, as expected,
neither can prevent the attack. In the case of the MINF
receiver, the min filter cannot remove the adversarial signal
present in every frame. Distance-decrease begins at SNRA
about 7dB larger than for vanilla, but only because of a
more conservative back-search threshold (inherent to MINF);
it ends at the same SNRA as vanilla. In the case of the
PID receiver, distance-decrease starts at the same SNRA as
vanilla, but ends at SNRA approximately 5dB lower than
for vanilla and is due to coarse synchronization failure. The
difference in performance occurs because the PID method
cannot distinguish the strong enough adversarial pulses from
the strongest honest pulses. (Note: In [18] we show how the
adversary can use this effect to improve attack performance.)
For the vanilla and MINF receivers, the attack performance
improves slightly if the modulation scheme uses time-hopping
for data. This is because, for these receivers, the attack fails at
high SNR due to interference with the data part of the packet.
Data time-hopping mitigates some of this interference.
For the vanilla rake receiver, the effectiveness of the attack
depends on the sum of the amplitudes of the fine synchroniza-
tion template. On one hand, if the sum is non-zero, distance-
decrease will occur. This is confirmed in Fig. 5, which shows
the attack performance at SNRH = 10dB when the template
amplitudes follow the IEEE 802.15.4a preamble code 5. In
this code, for every 10 frames with ai = 1, there are only
6 frames with ai = −1. The attack performance follows
the familiar pattern, and the distance-decrease reaches 80%
- 100% depending on the data modulation scheme (not shown
in figure) – data is the main factor liming attack performance.
On the other hand, a fine synchronization template that sums
to zero cancels out the constant cicada code, and no distance-
decrease occurs.
2) Preamble with Time-hopping: The attack works well
against the vanilla and PID energy-detection receivers (Fig. 6).
Compared to the case without preamble time-hopping,
distance-decrease begins at higher SNRA, because the adver-
sarial pulses are not aligned, rather spread from the perspective
of the receiver – hence it takes more power to raise them
above the fine synchronization threshold. For vanilla, distance-
decrease ends at the same SNRA with and without preamble
time-hopping, because the limiting factor is data demodula-
tion. However, for PID, distance-decrease ends significantly
later for the case with preamble time-hopping. This is because
for PID without time-hopping, the limiting factor is coarse
synchronization (see Sec. IV-A1). Preamble time-hopping cir-
cumvents this limitation.
For the vanilla rake receiver, the attack performance is
shown in Fig. 5, and it follows the same pattern as for
the vanilla energy detector, with data demodulation being
the limiting factor. However, with preamble time-hopping the
attack now works with a zero-sum template.
For the MINF receiver, the min filter is somewhat effective
in stopping the attack, once the adversarial pulses are randomly
spread due to the time-hopping. In Fig. 6 we show the
performance of a 16-attack, which manages to reach almost
20% probability of distance-decrease. This is significantly
lower than for the other receivers, but still far from negligible.
3) Ranging Error: In Fig. 7 we show the median absolute
error of the ToA under the 8-attack (for packets for which
distance-decrease occurs). It increases with SNRA, because
more adversarial peaks rise above the fine-synchronization
threshold. For a high SNRA, an adversarial pulse in the start
of the back-search window is almost always detected as the
ToA, hence the distance-decrease tends to TBS. However, the
starting point of the back-search is the strongest path in HTX’s
signal, which can be greater than the actual distance. In such
cases, the distance-decrease is necessarily smaller than TBS.
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Fig. 8. Distance-decrease rate achieved by a
coded 16-attack against a vanilla rake receiver at
SNRH = 20dB. The number of frames during
which adversary transmits (out of 120) is denoted
by n.
Nevertheless, assuming a fixed channel between HTX and
HRX (e.g., ranging repeated in a short time interval), a high-
rate attack achieves a low distance-decrease variance. This
ToA error pattern is universal to all receivers.
4) Clock Drift: An unsophisticated or blind adversary will
not have the means to adjust its clock speed to exactly match
the clock of HTX. We verify that clock drift of 40ppm (the
largest allowed by IEEE 802.15.4a) has a negligible effect on
the attack effectiveness for energy detectors, and a minor effect
(5dB shift of attack start) for rake receivers.
B. Blind Attacks: Coded “Cicada” Attack
We now consider an “coded” version of the cicada attack.
It is identical to the basic cicada attack, except that the
adversary modulates the amplitudes of the pulses using a
non-constant code. This allows the adversary to mount a
successful attack against a vanilla rake receiver with zero-sum
fine synchronization template (without time-hopping).
Assume that the number of non-zero elements in the fine
synchronization template is N and that the time-offset t
contains only adversarial signal. Then, fine synchronization
considers the offset t as a valid ToA candidate if:
|
N−1∑
i=0
aPi a
A
i x(t)| > Nθ (3)
where aPi , a
A
i ∈ {−1, 0, 1} are the honest and adversar-
ial codes, respectively, x(t) represents the adversarial signal
power at offset t, and θ is a noise-based threshold.
The preamble code aPi can be chosen to be pseudo-random,
which is the worst case for the adversary. This implies
P(aPi aAi = −1 | aPi 6= 0) = P(aPi aAi = 1 | aPi 6= 0) = 0.5.
Then, the probability of spoofing the ToA for a single time-
offset t is:
P(A(t)) = P(|2B(n, 0.5)− n| > Nθx−1(t)) (4)
= 2 · P(2B(n, 0.5)− n > Nθx−1(t))
= 2 · FBIN(0.5n− 0.5Nθx−1(t)|n, 0.5)
≤ 2 exp(−N2θn−1x−1(t)) ≤ 2 exp(−Nθx−1(t))
where n ≤ N is the number of non-zero elements in the ad-
versarial code aAi , B(n, 0.5) follows the binomial distribution
with parameters n and 0.5 and FBIN(.|n, 0.5) is the binomial
cdf; the first bound follows from the Hoeffding’s inequality.
Although the probability of spoofing decreases exponen-
tially fast with N , the transmission power x(t) is under the
control of the adversary. By increasing x(t), the adversary can
achieve a reasonable spoofing probability for practical values
of N and θ. Indeed, Fig. 8 shows practical instances of this
attack. To increase the attack success probability, the attack
rate is ρ = 16, meaning that 4 to 5 adversarial frames fall into
the back-search window. Although (4) suggests to set n = N ,
this does not take into account the interference created by the
adversarial signal during other reception stages. Indeed, Fig. 8
shows that the adversary achieves better results with n = 12,
rather than n = 120, where N = 120 in both cases.
C. Reactive Attacks
A reactive adversary can leverage the synchronization with
HRX to increase the upper limit on SNRA. Knowing the
algorithms run by the honest receiver, the adversary will know
(roughly) when the receiver is performing which stage. Then,
it can transmit only when fine synchronization is performed,
with an arbitrary high power and high rate ρ, which would
guarantee that the ToA is spoofed. If no other stage is
performed on this signal, then the adversary will not interfere
with these stages. This guarantees correct packet reception.
However, a receiver can perform other reception stages on
the same signal as fine synchronization. If this stage is coarse
synchronization, SNRA cannot exceed SNRH, or the honest
signal will be overshadowed by the adversarial signal. If this
stage is channel estimation, SNRA can be increased, but not
indefinitely. Intuitively, the ratio between SNRA and SNRH in
channel estimation determines how much weight is put on the
bogus part versus how much is put on the honest information-
bearing part of the data symbols.
D. Known Code Attacks
We now look at a targeted version of the malicious interfer-
ence attack, in which the adversary knows the preamble code
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Fig. 9. Distance-decrease rate achieved by known-code attack mounted
against a vanilla energy detection receiver at SNRH = 20dB. We show
the performance under two adversarial channel models: the default one and
a single-tap channel (“1-tap”). We distinguish between the usual success in
spoofing the 1st path (“1st”), and spoofing of the strongest path (“Str”). In
the data, we fix SNRDA = −∞dB.
and is tightly synchronized with HTX. Under these assump-
tions, the adversary can spoof the ToA easily, by transmitting
a copy of the preamble that arrives at HRX k nanoseconds
before the honest preamble. In the data part, the adversary
knows the time-hopping sequence, but not the amplitudes –
they are determined by the unpredictable challenge/response
bits. Hence, ATX transmits a pulse k nanoseconds before
each honest pulse, with SNRDA. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the adversarial pulse has a constant amplitude,
whereas the honest pulse has an amplitude of 0/1 for OOK
modulation, or of ±1 for BPSK modulation. Note that in
the case of a distance-decreasing relay attack or a malicious
prover attack, the adversary would transmit a signal that
is the combination of the honest signal and the adversarial
signal described above. Hence, we focus on the malicious
interference attack.
We can see in Fig. 9 that this attack achieves virtually 100%
distance-decrease across a relatively broad range of SNRA.
(We set SNRDA = −∞.) Due to tight synchronization, the
distance-decrease is much less variable that with the blind
attacks. For k = 20ns, the 5- and 95-percentiles of absolute
ToA error are 10ns and 22ns at SNRA = 10dB and 17ns
and 22ns at SNRA = 15dB. With the single-tap channel, they
are between 19ns and 22ns. Furthermore, the adversary can
succeed in spoofing not only the first arriving path, but even
the strongest path, albeit with a lower probability of success.
This circumvents a “countermeasure” that estimates ToA based
on the strongest path (Sec. V).
V. COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we use the findings of Sec. IV to propose
and evaluate countermeasures that can thwart the ToA attack
vector. After briefly covering naive countermeasures, we look
at three different types of stronger countermeasures: (1) secure
ToA estimation, (2) early data detection (EDD) that prevents
the attack by reducing the data detection window tdet and (3) a
variance countermeasure, that detects the attack based on the
high variance of the ToA estimates observed under multiple
measurements. The first two countermeasures are universally
applicable, whereas the variance countermeasure should be
coupled with secret preamble time-hopping and a large back-
search window. For the variance countermeasure and secure
ToA estimation preamble-only packets are sufficient if both
ranging devices are honest. However, if the prover can be ma-
licious, additional data unpredictable to the prover is necessary.
A. Naive Countermeasures
An obvious way of countering the attack is to disable fine
synchronization, and estimate ToA based on the strongest path.
This has, however, the significant disadvantage of decreasing
the ranging precision. Furthermore, an adversary that knows
the preamble codes and that is precisely synchronized with the
honest transmitter can circumvent this method (Sec. IV-D).
In Sec. IV-A2 we have seen that the MINF energy-detection
receiver, if coupled with secret preamble time-hopping, can
offer some degree of protection against the attack. However,
the adversary still has a non-negligible probability of success,
thus making this a relatively weak countermeasure.
B. Secure ToA Estimation
The key to securing the ToA estimation is the PID method.
Indeed, we have seen in Sec. IV-B that a rake receiver that
does not use PID is vulnerable to an attack by an adversary
that transmits with high power.
1) PID Rake: Assuming that the ±1 amplitudes of non-
zero preamble frames are random, and the rake receiver uses
the PID method, we can apply an almost identical reasoning
as in (4) to estimate the probability of spoofing the ToA for a
single time-offset t:
P(A(t)) = P(|2B(n, 0.5)− n| > Nθ) (5)
= 2 · FBIN(0.5n− 0.5Nθ|n, 0.5)
≤ 2 exp(−Nθ)
where N is the number of non-zero frames in the fine
synchronization template, n ≤ N is the number of non-zero
frames in the adversarial code aAi , and θ is a noise-based
threshold. The difference with (4) is that the power factor x
disappears. This is crucial, because now the adversary can no
longer increase the transmission power to compensate for an
exponentially fast decline of P(A(t)). Hence, the PID rake
receiver is secure against the attack, if the values of N and θ
are chosen appropriately. This can be done in the same fashion
as for the PIDH countermeasure, and the effect on ranging
precision will be similar, hence we omit the details.
2) PIDH Countermeasure: The PIDH ToA estimation re-
lies on the PID method, but it uses the Hamming distance
in place of correlation. Hence, we call it Power Independent
Detection with the Hamming distance (PIDH).
More specifically, the PIDH fine synchronization algorithm
takes as input: (1) the known preamble template ai=1,...,N ∈
{0, 1}, and (2) a sequence of samples yi=1,...,N ∈ {0, 1} (after
applying the PID filter) corresponding to some time-offset t.
Then, the time-offset t is considered a valid ToA candidate if:
d(yi, ai) ≤TPIDH (6)
8where d is the Hamming distance and TPIDH is a threshold.
For optimal security, the template ai should be a random
binary sequence. Under this assumption, for a single time-
offset t, the adversary can spoof the ToA with probability:
P(A(t)) = FBIN(TPIDH|N, 0.5) (7)
Given that there are NBS time-offsets in the back-search
window that a receiver evaluates, the total probability that the
adversary achieves a distance-decrease can be upper-bounded
by:
P(A)=P(
⋃
A(tj))≤
∑
P(A(tj)=NBS ·FBIN(TPIDH|N, 0.5)
(8)
For a desired security level Pattack, we can invert (8) and obtain
a threshold TPIDH that achieves this security level:
TPIDH = F
−1
BIN(Pattack|N, 0.5) ·N−1BS (9)
C. Early Data Detection
The idea of the early data detection (EDD) countermeasure
is simple: shrink the data detection window drastically, such
that any distance-decrease removes the honest signal from the
window, making data demodulation fail. More specifically, the
countermeasure works as follows:
1) ToA estimation. Perform non-secure fine synchroniza-
tion to find the first arriving path. Denote the preamble
template length by Ntoa.
2) Verification. Perform data demodulation with detection
window tdet = Tint (on the time-offset determined by
fine synchronization); reject the packet if the number of
errors is above Nerr. The data length is Nnonce.
The EDD countermeasure offers poor benign-case perfor-
mance if the first path is weak: The ToA estimation can detect
such a path, but it is likely that this path is too weak to
perform reliable data demodulation, resulting in a rejection
of a valid ranging packet. To address this, we propose the
following extension:
1) ToA estimation. Perform non-secure fine synchroniza-
tion that selects Noff time-offsets ti:
a) t1 is selected as the first offset in the back-search
window above the noise-based threshold (regular
ToA estimation).
b) ti+1 is selected as the first offset in the back-search
window above the ith time-offset. The last offset
tNoff corresponds to the strongest path.
2) Verification. Perform data demodulation with detection
window tdet = Tint for every time-offset ti; choose the
final ToA estimate to be the first ti for which the number
of errors is below Nerr. The data length is Nnonce
This countermeasure finds the first path that is strong
enough for secure verification. Hence, in some cases it returns
a ToA that is slightly larger than the true ToA, rather than
rejecting the packet as EDD does. We hence term it EDD
with Graceful degradation (EDDG).
An obvious drawback of this type of countermeasures is
a significant reduction of data demodulation reliability. How-
ever, this can be compensated by increasing the data length.
For a desired security level Pattack, the values of Nnonce and
Nerr can be determined by a formula equivalent to (9):
Nerr = F
−1
BIN(Pattack|Nnonce, 0.5) ·N−1off (10)
Note that a countermeasure based on shrinking the data
detection window was first proposed in [6]. The name of EDD
is, ironically, based on the early detection attack, in which
the adversary decreases the data detection window to obtain
a distance-decrease [5]. A version of this countermeasure is
also advocated in [8]. See [8] for the derivation of (10).
D. Variance Countermeasure
The variance countermeasure prevents the attack by per-
forming multiple ToA measurements and by detecting a high
variance of the ToA estimates caused by the attack. In its
basic form, this countermeasure can mitigate some naive
adversaries. To be truly effective, it should be coupled with a
secret preamble time-hopping and (perhaps counter-intuitively)
a large back-search window.
ToA estimation with the basic variance countermeasure
proceeds in the following Steps:
1. Perform M independent ToA measurements, thus obtain-
ing ToA estimates t1, . . . , tM .
2. If the ratio of failed measurements is above Rfail, reject.
Consider a ToA measurement that is “too small” (see
below) as failed.
3. If Var(ti) > Tvar, reject.
4. Compute the final ToA estimate t = median(ti).
Rfail and Tvar are parameters that can be set based on
the desired benign- and adversarial-case performance of the
system.
The variance countermeasure should be coupled with secret
preamble time-hopping. Otherwise, the adversary (notably a
tightly synchronized one) can achieve a constant distance-
decrease on all ToA estimates and mitigate the variance test in
Step 3. Furthermore, even with secret preamble time-hopping,
a high-rate attack achieves a low variance (in the order of
the square of the adversarial inter-pulse spacing). However,
under such an attack the final ToA estimate falls into the
beginning of the back-search window. Hence, we can chose a
large TBS, forcing a high-rate attack to result in a “too small”
ToA estimate that will be rejected in Step 2. A “too small”
ToA estimate can be detected if it results in a negative distance
estimate (in case of ranging). Or, it can be detected implicitly
if the back-search window is set to be noticeably larger than
the data detection window tdet, thus making data demodulation
fail under a high distance-decrease. In addition, Step 2 prevents
an adversary from deliberately failing a significant number
of ToA estimates ti, thus achieving a higher probability of
circumventing the variance test in Step 3.
Determining the security level of this countermeasure is
much less straightforward than for the other countermeasures.
We provide an estimate of this probability under a specific
set of parameters: We set TBS = 2tdet and set the maximum
time-hopping offset to tdet, where tdet = 64ns. We set Rfail = 0
and Tvar = (5ns)2, which balances good benign-case perfor-
mance with security. Larger values of Rfail and Tvar improve
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Fig. 10. Countermeasures benign case performance: We show the precise-
ToA rate (“PIDH”, “EDD(G)”, “VarC”), as a function of the number of frames
N at SNRH = 20dB. For the vulnerable PID algorithm, N = Ntoa (the
template length), likewise for PIDH. For EDD (G), N = Ntoa +Nnonce, the
latter being the length of the data (roughly 5 to 7 times larger than Ntoa).
For the variance countermeasure, N is the length of the fine synchronization
template times M . In addition, we show the failure rate (“failed”). Note that
we ignore the data frames necessary for all countermeasures except EDD (G);
such data frames are necessary to defend against a malicious prover.
benign case performance slightly, but they degrade security
significantly.
Furthermore, we assume (for simplicity) that there is only
one frame per ToA estimation, and we consider the following,
powerful adversary. The adversary is tightly synchronized,
and knows exactly when a honest preamble pulses with
time-hopping offsets 0 are sent; we denote this time by 0.
(Obviously, the adversary does not know the secret time-
hopping offsets). Finally, the adversary wants to achieve a
distance-decrease of at least 3m.
We determine numerically that the best strategy for this
adversary is to transmit a pulse at time 0. Indeed, a pulse
transmitted at time t < 0 causes measurement rejection if
the preamble time-hopping offset is above tdet − t. This leads
to crossing the Rfail threshold. A pulse transmitted at time
t > 0 results in ttdet of the ToA estimates having no distance-
decrease (all preamble frames with time-hopping offset below
t). If this fraction is large, only a small distance-decrease can
occur (lower than 3m). If the fraction is small, the variance
is actually increased, because all the ToA estimates ti without
distance-decrease are far from the mean ToA. Given the t = 0
strategy, the distance-decrease for the M measurements can
be modeled as M iid uniform random variables ranging from
0 to tdet · c. We obtain numerically that to limit Pattack ≤ 2−16,
we need to set M ≥ 11.
E. Performance Evaluation
We compare the benign case performance of the counter-
measures tuned to provide the same security level, which
we fix at Pattack = 2−16. We derive the thresholds for
PIDH, EDD and EDDG according to (9) and (10); for the
variance countermeasure, M was estimated in Sec. V-D. Our
primary metric pertains to ranging precision: We count the
percentage of ToA estimations for which the receiver finds the
first path, i.e., the ranging error is below 2ns. We term this
metric precise-ToA rate. We find it to be more informative
than the rather coarse-grained mean absolute ranging error.
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Fig. 11. Countermeasures performance under constant 8-attack (at SNRA =
8dB). We show the precise-ToA rate (“PIDH”, “EDD”, “EDDG”), as a
function of the number of frames N at SNRH = 20dB. For PIDH, N is
the template length. For EDD/EDDG, N = Ntoa + Nnonce, where Ntoa is
the template length and Ndata is length of the data. We also show the failure
rate of all methods (“failed”).
Furthermore, we count the percentage of ToA estimations that
fail, i.e., the failure rate. The exact values that we obtain are
specific to the channel model (the NLOS model number 2
from [3]), but we are interested in the relative performance of
different countermeasures.
The precise-ToA and failure rates of the countermeasures
is show in Fig. 10. In terms of ranging precision, EDD and
EDDG display a virtually identical precise-ToA rate. Both
outperform PIDH for all N . EDD/EDDG and PIDH work in
a similar fashion, and the performance difference is mostly
due to NBS being much higher than Noff in (9) and (10) –
resulting in a more conservative threshold for PIDH. EDD also
outperforms the variance countermeasure for low N ; for higher
N , the variance countermeasure perform slightly better than
EDD. Compared to the basic PID method, which is not secure
against the ToA attack vector, all countermeasures experience
a significant performance drop: the cost of precision and
security is quite high.
In terms of failure rate, PIDH and EDDG (latter not shown
in figure) display negligible failure for N > 100. This is in
contrast to EDD that experiences a failure rate of 2− 3% (as
expected). The variance countermeasure shows a failure rate of
below 1%. Under attack (Fig. 11), EDDG and PIDH achieve
a precise-ToA rate in the order of 80%, and a failure rate in
the order of 5%. In contrast, the failure rate for EDD is quite
high, and for the variance countermeasure is it virtually 100%
(not in figure). In the latter case, this is caused by reliable
attack detection on subsequent packet rejection. Although the
attack robustness shown by EDDG and PIDH can be desirable
in some cases, is not a crucial feature – an adversary aiming
at denial can obtain a 100% failure rate by simply increasing
the transmission power.
Taking both metrics into account, we can recommend
EDDG as the most robust and precise countermeasure. Al-
though the variance countermeasure can offer a slightly higher
precision, it comes at a cost of non-negligible failure rate,
notably under attack, and longer frames to accommodate time-
hopping and a long back-search window. (For our choice of
parameters, the frame duration is doubled).
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VI. CONCLUSION
We have identified a novel attack vector against IR-UWB
ranging. The attack allows an adversary to decrease the
distance measured by ranging protocols that are designed
to be precise (by searching for the first arriving path). The
attack disrupts the time-of-arrival (ToA) estimation procedure,
exploiting a fundamental difficulty in distinguishing the signal
of interest from interference. We have demonstrated that even
a simple-to-mount variant of this attack (the “cicada” attack)
is effective against a number of modulation schemes and
receivers.
Furthermore, we have shown that the attack can be thwarted
by a three types of countermeasure. First, we identify a secure
ToA estimation algorithm (PID) for rake receivers, and pro-
pose a new algorithm (PIDH) for energy-detection receivers.
Second, we revisit the early data detection countermeasure
proposed in [6], and propose a more robust extension (EDDG).
Third, we propose a variance countermeasure that prevents
the attack if coupled with a secret preamble time-hopping and
a long back-search window. All three countermeasures allow
for ranging that is both precise and secure, meaning that they
prevent the adversary from decreasing the measured distance
by more than the ranging precision of the receiver. This is an
improvement on the state of the art for IR-UWB, in which
the achievable distance-decrease was limited to approximately
10m [8]. We have demonstrated that security comes at a
cost: Achieving a good ranging precision requires packets of
length an order of magnitude larger than ranging algorithms
vulnerable to the ToA attack vector.
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APPENDIX
EXPERIMENTS ON AN IR TEST-BED
We evaluate the cicada attack performance on an Impulse-
Radio test-bed [33]. The test-bed is designed for TDOA
localization. It comprises a set of static receivers and a set of
mobile transmitters. The transmitter is composed of a front-
end (described in [34]) and of a simple modulator module. The
transmitter can send a train of pulses with pulse repetition
frequency (PRF) of 10MHz. The train of pulses can on/off
modulated. Pulses have a bandwidth of 500MHz at 4.25GHz
central frequency. The receiver front-end is a energy-detection
receiver with a twist inconsequential for our investigation. The
receiver back-end is composed of analog-to-digital converter
(ADC) which sampling of 2.842GS/s and 8 bit resolution and a
Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), connected to a PC.
The FPGA has relatively limited memory of 140Kb, which
influences the experiment design. The receiver is described in
detail in [33].
At the time we performed the experiments, the test-bed was
still under development and it did not provide synchronization
between any pairs of devices (i.e., no common clock base).
This causes the following difficulty: When the receiver esti-
mates the ToA, there is no ground truth ToA that the estimate
could be compared with. Hence, we cannot directly determine
if a distance-decrease has occurred.
A. Experiment Design
We resolve the limitations of the test-bed with a new exper-
iment design. We involve the usual set of devices: HTX, ATX
and HRX. HTX transmits a series of ranging packets back-
to-back. Each ranging packet is composed of one preamble
symbol, composed of 31 frames modulated according to the
IEEE 802.15.4a preamble code no 5. (We refrain from using
complete ranging packets due to the modest memory on the
FPGA.) ATX transmits periodically a sequence of 4·31 frames
modulated with a sequence of 2 · 31 ones followed by 2 · 31
zeros. Note that this is a simple variant of the cicada attack
with rate ρ = 1. The frame duration is 100ns. Examples of
the HTX and ATX signals are shown in Fig. 13.
This transmission pattern has the following result: Some of
the honest ranging packets are affected by the cicada signal,
and some are not. We use the latter ranging packets to estimate
the ground truth ToA.
In a single experiment, we capture 12µs of samples (max-
imum that the FPGA allows). The duration of a preamble
symbol is 3.1µs, hence in one experiment we obtain a ToA
estimate for 3 ranging packets (dashed lines in Fig. 13(a)).
We consider two configurations: In configuration (A), there
are no obstacles between either transmitter and the receiver. In
configuration (B) we attenuate the ATX signal by putting a tin-
foil obstacle between ATX and HRX. In both configurations,
the distances between HTX and HRX and ATX and HRX are
in the order of one meter. The test-bed is located in the corner
of a 10m by 10m electrical engineering lab room. For each
configuration, we perform 1000 experiments.
We define SNR as the ratio between the signal power
and the noise power. (In contrast to the other section of the
paper, where we define SNR as the ratio between the pulse
energy and the noise spectral density, Ep/N0. Converting
Ep/N0 to Psignal/Pnoise entails subtracting roughly 24dB.) In
both configurations, SNRH ≈ 22dB. In configuration (A),
SNRA ≈ 21dB. In configuration (B), SNRA varies between
6dB and 17dB with mean 11dB. Note that these signals are
significantly stronger than the signals used in the simulations.
This is due to the short distances between devices in the
experiment setup.
B. Metrics
We define the coverage of a ranging packet received by
HRX as the percentage of the packet that is covered by the
ATX signal (Fig. 13). In practice, we compute the coverage
based on the position of the cicada signal, which we detect
with the PIDH method. (We chose this method for its robust-
ness.) We note that the detection is not extremely accurate (it
can be off by a few frames), but this is good enough for our
purposes.
Based on the coverage, we define the ground truth ToA
estimate as the HRX ToA estimate for the preamble symbol
with coverage 0. If no preamble symbol has such coverage,
we discard the experiment. We measure the ToA estimation
error by comparing the other two ToA estimates (coarse or
fine) to the ground truth ToA estimate.
For a preamble symbol we consider that denial occurs
(synchronization fails) if the coarse synchronization error is
greater than 100ns. We consider that distance-decrease occurs
if denial does not occur and if the fine synchronization
ToA estimate is lower by more than 4ns than the ground
truth estimate. We then measure the denial rate and distance-
decrease rate as the percentage of preamble symbols for which
denial or distance-decrease occurs, respectively.
Note that contrary to simulations performed in Sec. IV,
denial can occur due to a benign failure. This is because we
are working with prototype-grade hardware, which sometime
results in imperfections in the received signals. (Note the pulse
amplitude variability in Fig. 13, notably (c)).
C. Honest Receiver Operation
HRX operation is adjusted to the signal transmitted by HTX.
Most notably, the receiver only performs synchronization, but
no channel estimation, SFD detection or data demodulation.
Coarse synchronization can be significantly simplified com-
pared to Sec. III, as HRX can a priori assume that the HTX
signal is always present. HRX simply correlates the received
signal with a template that corresponds to one preamble
symbol; it then chooses the maximum in the correlator output
of duration 3.1µs, which is the “ranging packet” duration (i.e.,
one preamble symbol).
Fine synchronization is performed on the same signal as
coarse synchronization. It follows the description in Sec. III,
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Fig. 12. Distance-decrease rate and denial rate as a function of coverage.
Configuration (A) results are shown in (a) for vanilla, (b) for PID and (c) for
MINF. Configuration (B) results are shown in (d) for vanilla, (e) for PID and
(f) for MINF. We shown 95% confidence intervals for distance-decrease rate.
searching back from the coarse ToA estimate for a time-offset
above a threshold. The only differences are the duration of the
back-search window (32ns in place of 64ns, corresponding to
the observed channel spread) and the MINF window size (4
in place of 8, to account for honest signal imperfections).
In our implementation, we use the ADC and FGPA to
capture the samples, and send them to the PC, where all
subsequent receiver operations are implemented in Matlab.
This minimizes the implementation overhead. It also allows
us to process the samples off-line and to run different receiver
algorithms on the same input.
D. Experimental Results
We show the distance-decrease rate and the denial rate
as a function of coverage in Fig. 12. The results met our
expectations. Consider the first configuration (A), where the
ATX signal is roughly as strong as the HTX signal. For low
coverage, the vanilla receiver shows some distance-decrease.
The distance-decrease increases up to roughly 20% as the
coverage increases, and for coverage beyond 0.3 denial starts
to take over. To explain this behavior, recall that the vanilla
receiver sums the samples from the frames indicated by the
template. Hence, the coverage effectively works as a multi-
plying factor for the total adversarial signal power; e.g., at
coverage 0.5, SNRA can be considered approximately 3dB
lower than at coverage 1. Thus, the distance-decrease rate
and denial rate follow the same pattern that in Sec. IV.
A similar coverage interpretation can be applied to MINF
receiver, although it should be noted that the min filter causes
some non-linear distortion. In particular, at low coverage, the
min filter removes the cicada signal completely, and thus no
distance-decrease is observed. In general, the performance
pattern of the attack is similar as for vanilla, but the distance-
decrease rate reaches only roughly 10% due to a conservative
MINF threshold value.
For the PID receiver, there is no simple parallel between
the coverage and SNRA, but we can find an equally simple
interpretation. In noiseless conditions, the output of the PID
correlator at a time-offset corresponding to the true ToA (the
start of the “ranging packet”) is equal to N , the number of non-
zero frames in the template. With coverage x, the output of the
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Fig. 13. Samples from the HRX’s ADC for a single experiment: HTX signal
only is shown in (a), the dashed lines show the start of preamble symbols
(ranging packets). In (b) and (c) ARX signal only is shown. If (a) and (b)
interfere at HRX, the coverage of the 3 consecutive ranging packets is roughly
equal to 1, 0.9 and 0.
correlator at a time-offset with adversarial signal contribution
is roughly x · N . This explains why in Fig. 12(b) denial
becomes dominant only at coverage close to 1. This allows
the distance-decrease rate to reach roughly 35%.
In configuration (B) the ATX signal is weaker then the HTX
signal. Hence, for the vanilla and MINF filters, Fig. 12 can
be considered to show the performance for a low SNRA only.
This explains why denial occurs marginally, and the distance-
decrease rate increases with coverage. In contrast, for the PID
receiver the power of the adversarial signal plays a smaller
role, as long as it is above the PID filter threshold. Hence,
the attack performance in configuration (B) is close to the
performance in configuration (A).
Finally, we verify that no distance-decease occurs with the
PIDH fine synchronization algorithm. The other two counter-
13
measures are not applicable, as there is no payload and not
enough packets to get meaningful variance estimates.
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